The DPSN project is about "network enabled" distributed problem-solving organizations. In this context to be network enabled means that the emergence of the organization and its sustained functioning depends upon the use to computermediated telecommunication networks in recruiting, mobilizing and coordinating spatially distributed knowledge resources.
(metaphorically) as "network organizations" and contrasted with centrally managed and hierarchically structured organizational forms that are more characteristic of business corporations and public administrative bureaucracies.
"Network organization" is thus a term that can apply both to social organizations in which the relationships among the constituent actors are structured in some part by formal contracts, and to "communities" in which peer-to-peer interactions are not contractually based. In the absence of complete (fully specified) contracts, or, indeed, any contracts, social interactions within organizations will be governed by informal but mutually acknowledged norms of behavior with which compliance is mutually expected. Many of the more familiar large, goal-directed human social organizations coordinate their internal workings by using mixtures of (incomplete) contracts and informal social norms.
Part I A Simple and Generic Conceptual Framework for DSPN Studies
The DPSN project is studying a group of "cases" that have been selected as examples of spatially distributed and information-intensive organizations that have emerged with the evolution of the Internet. The accompanying "tableau" of projected case studies (Table 1 /v4/27.08.07) presents them in two groupings. Group I contains a variety of distributed "communities" that have established identities associated with the creation and production of particular technical and cultural artifacts or "products". These offer an opportunity to examine problem-solving procedures and routines that the community has utilizes to address (and solve) "problems" whose resolution is perceived to be a critical task for the achievement of its functional purpose(s). The cases in Group II are focused on Internet enable "platform mechanisms" that are deployed by information-intermediaries: they gather data and information from distributed individual actors and provide a means of processing ("mining") it to extract "signals" that offer solutions to "problems" that are of interest to third-party organizations.
Within each of those two groupings may be found a number of case studies concerned with organizations and mechanisms that have emerged quite recently into visibility on the Internet, and others that have evolved with repeated use over considerably longer time periods. In a broad sense, interest in the results of examining of the former, derives from questions about the viability and potentialities for long-term survival of these novel organizational forms and practices; whereas, for the case studies of more established organizations, there is an interest in the extent to which the contextual requirements for the particular solution-routines that they have been using, as well as their performance attributes, are such that they might be successfully adapted to other quite different domains of application. In this regard, the design of the project affords an opportunity to examine two aspects of the performance of contemporary DPSNs and may carry important implications for the future organization of information-intensive production activities on the Internet.
All the cases in this project are concerned with a problem-solving "organization" or system, whether or not the studies that can be carried out within this exploratory phase are able to examine all the parts of the system in equal detail. It is necessary at a minimum to relate the focus of all the case studies to the respective larger "system" of which it is a part (if not the whole), simply for the purposes of understanding the performance criteria and requirements that have a bearing on the contemporary and future domains of applicability.
To speak of such a system or organization as logically complete, one therefore must be able to identify its four essential aspects or dimensions: the "problem-holder(s)", the "problem-solvers", the "communication structure" for information flows among the problem-holder(s) and problem-solvers, and the nature of "the problem(s)" that are being address and solved (at least in some degree). To describe each case in reference to those four dimensions consequently provides a basic foundation for recognizing aspects of resemblance and differentiation among them.
Further, by articulating those four dimensions, and examining each of the cases in reference to them, it is possible to assemble the empirical ingredients for analyses that will shed light on why these particular DPSN arrangements have emerged and where and how they may be replicated. There is of course more than one theoretical perspective on organizational behavior that could be illuminating for this purpose, and the following brief remarks on the view from economics is not meant to preclude other approaches that might be explored.
To keep the analysis at its simplest level, one can start from the observation that the demand side of the story for a particular mode of distributed problem-solving is likely to reside in the characteristics of problem-holders and the attractiveness for them of seeking to mobilize external distributed knowledge resources, rather than assign the problem-solution task to an internal co-located team, or "out-source" it to another organization. "Attractiveness" from the perspective of the problem-holder, is a matter of comparative efficacy (including speed), cost, reliability, and control over information about the nature of the organization's problem and whatever solution may be obtained.
The nature of the problems that problem-holders select for solutions that are provided by external (distributed) actors, in general, will not be a representative sample of all those that arise in the course of their activities. Rather, the selectivity bias will reflect the problem-holder's capabilities with regard to the kinds of problems that can readily be formulated in ways that allow external agents (without extensive knowledge of the problem-holder's purposes, plans and internal organizational practices) to work effectively upon feasible solutions. It will, in addition, reflect the ability of the problem-holder to screen and evaluate the comparative merits ("worth") of the solutions that would be presented by external "solvers," and thus to select the best from among those received.
Turning to consider the supply side of the story, one has to recognize at least two possible arrangements: the problem holder can deal directly with actors that are the distributed sources of knowledge capabilities that can be brought to work on solving the whole or parts of "the problem"; or there may be an intermediating information agency, such as a web-based platform provider, that performs the function of mobilizing the sources of information from which proposed solutions can be offered to a problem-holder. In the former situation, the problem-holding entity has to consider the costs of identifying, contacting and transacting with a selected population of problem-solvers -identifying the size and the array of capabilities among them that are likely to be required to generate an acceptable solution to the chosen problem in a timely fashion. The process they use, moreover, has to be one whose nature and implementation is consistent with the continued participation of a sufficiently large and competent problem-solving community; otherwise the mechanism will not be sustainable. One way of putting this is to say that it is necessary, in order for the system to be in equilibrium (and therefore reproduce itself through time), that the expectations of the suppliers of the solutions and those of the problem-holder(s) be consistent and satisfied --directly or indirectly --by the distribution of outcomes. We can in this way speak about the matching of the "supply" and "demand" for problem solving without thereby suggesting that this is achieved through market institutions that commodify "solutions" and set prices so as to "clear the market."
In situations where there is an intermediating agency involved, it is possible for that entity to be specialized in collecting and mining information of more or less pre-specified kinds from populations of distributed sources that are "closed" or "open", and to offer such "products" as potential solutions to problem-holders. Platform operating intermediaries will perform more efficiently when they are able to develop relationships with "clients" that enable them to anticipate the array of "problems" for which solutions are in strong demand. At the same time, they will need to provide incentives or some forms of satisfaction that are sufficient to maintain the participation of the sources from which they gather data and information for analysis. For problem holders, the attractiveness of transacting for information with intermediaries will be influenced by the same array of considerations that would apply were they to directly manage their interactions with the distributed information sources, with a further complication that is called a "common agency problem": the principal's potential "costs" may also include those assignable to the expected risks entailed in sharing information about the nature of their problems with an agency that also may use that knowledge to serve the interests of its own (other) clients.
Whatever arrangements exist for bringing the needs of problem-holders together with the capabilities of distributed problem-solvers, any specific problemsolving system or "organization" will be characterized a particular structure of communications. This structure will determine -by technical or other means --when, and in what regards the problem-solvers are permitted to exchange information with one another about the problems on which they are working. Similarly, it will specify the way that information flows pass between problem-solvers and problem holders. The controls placed on flows of information within the system -whether by technological constraints or by contractual or other regulations --are likely to have a critical bearing upon the efficiency of the problem-solution process, its robustness to exogenous disruptions, and the distribution among the participating actors of the social benefits that result from the process. Being able to fully describe the permitted patterns of information flows within the organization as a whole, therefore, is likely to be an important step toward understanding such a system's potential functional performance, and the ways in which its realized performance will be evaluated from the different private vantage points of the parties that are involved. Taken together these form the main pillars upon which descriptions and analyses of particular cases can be constructed, in terms that permit a comparisons among them within a unifying framework that can be expanded to absorb findings from the study of other examples of the general phenomenon.
Many aspects of structural similarity and difference among specific "cases" can be identified by a taxonomic unfolding, or "unpacking" of each of the foregoing major dimensions. That can be done by drawing a number of distinctions in regard to each "dimension," selecting alternatives among those that are likely to have some important causal relationship to the actors' behaviors--whether as the endogenous resultants of decisions, or as exogenous structural features that are among the factors determining such decisions.
In principle, such an "unfolding" exercise could yield a very large number of possible "types" of DPSNs, each occupying a distinct position in a multi-dimensional space. But, while that might be of theoretical interest, it is neither necessary nor practical for our work to undertake and exhaustive mapping of that entire space ex ante. Some of its regions might well be empty of any real world examples, and much of it will not apply to those cases that have been selected in this exploratory project. Indeed, in our exploratory project we are only preparing a few of the conceivable number of distinctive arrangements that might be available for study. So, rather than go in that direction, we shall proceed from the outset to consider only a limited number of categorical distinctions that might turn out to be pertinent in regard to each of the four basic dimensions, and allow for further, more refined distinctions to be made if and where it appears important in the context of one or more specific case studies.
A straightforward way to start this "unfolding" operation is to work through a logical succession of questions under each of the four main (structural) headings, beginning with gross structural distinctions that can be applied across all the cases. The particular answer to each of these questions may be of greater importance in some cases than in others, and where it does seem to be potentially crucial, further differentiations and their implications can be, and should be pursued in the presentation of the case details.
4.
Has the problem-holder(s) organized the solution process themselves and provided explicit incentives for problem-solvers, or does the problem-holder transact indirectly with the latter, through the services it obtains from an external intermediary?
! If there is an external intermediary, is this agency an enterprise providing a platform and gathering solution options from many distributed sources? ! Alternatively, is the external agent a closed and hierarchically managed research enterprise with which problem solvers may contract? ! Or, are the external agents members of private professional or personal networks that can be accessed directly and informally for reciprocated exchanges of expert knowledge by a problem-holder (or individual employees)? ! Are "rewards" of any kind announced publicly -whether by the problemholder directly, or indirectly via an intermediary agent --for the solutions of pre-specified problems? If so, do these take a direct or an indirect pecuniary form, and do they stipulate precise requirements for a solution that will qualify for the reward? If not, is a non-pecuniary reward-such as public recognition-explicitly promised for successful solutions? ! Is the manner in which successful solutions (those qualifying for explicit rewards) of will be selected announced publicly to prospective problemsolvers? ! If they are expert, are they an ensemble of players, i.e., a "community" that has formed and continues to perform without a central conductor? or are they members of an "orchestra" or "big band", i.e., contractually related to a corporate entity and coordinated by a "conductor" (or "band-leader") and "first violinist" (or" lead instrumentalist") the counter parts for the less musically inclined being company directors and managers ! What is the form of the dominant effective reward set for the problem solvers, and who sets it if it is pecuniary, the problem holder, an intermediary agent, or the collectivity of problem solvers? Part III
III. Problem Solvers

Who
IV. Structure of Communications
Brief Notes on Implementation of the Proposed Framework
The main purpose of the foregoing questions is to provide some common conceptual tools and terminology that (1) facilitate comparative discussion of the selected cases, (2) highlight structural features relevant to the specification of performance metrics, (3) relate these to other studies of distributed problem-solving.
A further purpose is to suggest the array of questions that researchers responsible for preparing drafts describing the "case" should (eventually) be able to answer. But it is not proposed that the descriptive material should be structured as responses to these questions, or that it would address them in the particular order in which they have been set out in the preceding pages.
Quite the contrary, it is deliberately left for those who have familiarized themselves with the details of the case, including a knowledge of the circumstances of the emergence and evolution of the problem-solving organization, to find and point out significant connections among the issues identified by particular groups of questions that may make the "logic" of its features and performance properties more intelligible.
